MODELS FOR SECURITY INVESTMENT IN ELECTRICITY MARKET

N. Zhang∗

References

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  4. [4] N.R. Boisvert & B. Neenan, Social welfare implications of demand response programs in competitive electricity markets, Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory Report No. LBNL52530, http://www.lbl.gov/, 2003.
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  7. [7] N. Zhang, Models for security investment in electricity market, Proc. Power and Energy System 2008 Conference, Baltimore, MD, 2008.

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