J. Konorski
WLAN, adhoc network performance, selfish behavior
For an ad hoc IEEE 802.11 WLAN we investigate how a backoff attack (configuring small minimum and/or maximum CSMA/CA contention windows at some stations in pursuit of a large bandwidth share) affects a proposed capacity-fairness index CFI. If the backoff mechanism is mandatory, the CSMA/CA game that arises has a unique Nash equilibrium. In the opposite case there is no single compelling outcome; we envisage that a station then calculates backoff attack incentives to predict imminent play. We link CFI to the network size, "power awareness," a station's perception of the other stations' susceptibility to incentives, and the way of learning how the stations perceive the other stations' susceptibility to incentives. We show that if the stations are few and "power aware," cooperative behavior emerges quite frequently.
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