D3L - A Framework on Fighting Against Non-Invasive Attacks to Integrated Circuits for Security Applications

J. Di and Fengwei Yang (USA)


: dual-spacer, dual-rail, delay-insensitive circuit, non-invasive attack, security


The protection of security information stored in electronic circuits has long been a major concern of circuit designers for security applications. Power and timing information based non-invasive attacking algorithms are able to extract key information by monitoring the external circuit behavior, which is very difficult to mask in synchronous logic and traditional dual-rail asynchronous logic. This paper presents a dual-spacer dual-rail delay insensitive logic (D3 L). Together with on-the-fly random spacer selection scheme, digital circuits implementing D3 L have highly stable power dissipation and data-independent timing performance, which will make power/timing-based non-invasive attacks virtually impossible, thus providing satisfactory level of protection for commercial/military security applications.

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